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Abstract:  
 
Temporality is one of the tools enabling courts to deal with the consequences of a judgment. The 
present paper focuses on the special case of temporality in judicial review type judgments, ie the 
doctrine of temporal limitation of a judgment by the Court of Justice of the EU in the procedure of a 
preliminary ruling. Although the primary goal of the doctrine was to avoid harsh consequences in 
cases determined by the conventional retroactive application of a judgment, the doctrine has created its 
own costs. The paper is an attempt to discuss the arguments of the Court from the perspective of a 
consequences-based argumentation regarding the temporal effects of a preliminary ruling. The 
analysis provided is merely the positive type of insights regarding the current argumentation of the 
Court which aims to extend the view on the social impact driven argumentation of the Court.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (referred to below as ‘the Court’ or ‘the Court 
of Justice’) was created to be an enforcer of European law as well as to be the constitutional 
and administrative authority on European Community legal issues.1 As every other court it 
employs various methods of legal reasoning including both rights-based and goal-based 
types of arguments.2 Today the Court is the object of discussions throughout Europe on 
such important questions as judicial activism, political autonomy and influential authority. 
The debate often includes matters of the reasoning of the Court as well as the consequences 
of its judgments. The Court of Justice applies rules in particular types of procedures. Most 
of the procedures end up with judgments having a conventional rule of ex nunc (meaning 
‘from now on’) with regards to its temporality. However, three of the procedures3 have the 
temporal effects of ex tunc (meaning from ‘the outset’). Therefore, the specific element of 
temporality has a potential effect on the social consequences of a judgment, especially if the 
judgment is to be applied retroactively as in the case of the ex tunc effect. 
 
The preliminary ruling is the most frequently used instrument (accounting for over 50 per 
cent of all cases heard by the Court) and it plays a key role in the development and 
enforcement of EU law.4 Although the preliminary ruling is one of three types of 
procedures with a retroactive temporal effect of judgment, the temporal aspect of the 
preliminary ruling was among the areas which were shattered by the need for intervention 
into the conventional rules of the founding Treaties in 1976.5 Therefore, it might be useful 
to analyse the reason the Court has created an exception from the retroactive application of 
the preliminary ruling in terms of its consequences from the perspective of the 
consequences for the whole of society.6 
 
The present paper aims to analyse the application of the retroactivity principle by the Court 
in the procedure of a preliminary ruling from the perspective of consequences-based 
arguments. For this reason, the argumentation of the Court regarding the temporal effect of 
a preliminary ruling is ascertained in the light of the framework of an analysis of the 
consequences of a judgment. The background framework is influenced by the analysis of 
consequence-based arguments proposed by Peter Cserne.7 The setting consists of a system 
of an economic analysis hypothetically conducted by a judge. It also reflects the conceptual 
framework of Jürgen G. Backhaus8. The structure of the framework is based on the three-
                                                 
1 Karen J Alter, The European Court’s Political Power: Selected Essays (OUP 2009) 288. 
2 The distinctive criteria of a judgment could also be identified as ‘absolutistic’ and ‘relativistic or in other 
terms, depending on the perspective and the context of the analysis’. 
3 Actions for failure to fulfil an obligation (Article 258 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European 
Union [2008] OJ C115/13 (referred below as ‘TFEU’), Action for annulment (Article 263 of the TFEU and 
References for a preliminary ruling (Article 267 of the TFEU). 
4 Josephine Steiner, Lorna Woods, Chistian Twigg-Flesner, EU Law (9th edn, OUP 2006) 193. 
5 From the case Defrenne v SABENA II (referred to below as ‘Defrenne’) in 1976 when the conventional rule 
was not applied due to social consequences anticipated by the Court, Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II 
[1976] ECR 455. 
6 More conceptually ‘macro-level real consequences’ in comparison to ‘micro-level real consequences’ as the 
consequences merely for interested parties. See Klaus Mathis, ‘Consequentalism in Law’ (2010) LawEcon 
Workshop, University of Bonn, 3-4 <http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-
workshop/archive/paper-mathis> accessed 25 April 2013. 
7 Peter Cserne, ‘Consequence-Based Arguments in Legal Reasoning: A Jurisprudential Preface to Law and 
Economics‘ in Klaus Mathis (ed), Efficiency, Sustainability, and Justice to Future Generations (Springer 2011), 45 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1684043> accessed 12 March 2013. 
8 Jürgen G Backhaus, ‘Towards an Ideal Economic Analysis of a Legal Problem’ in Jürgen G Backhaus (ed), 
The Elgar Companion to Law and Economics (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing 2005) 465-472. 
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step procedure of the optimisation of a judgment under uncertainty9: (i) the identification of 
the social consequences which matter for a court; (ii) the measuring of the impact of the 
alternative consequences; and (iii) the evaluating of which type of judgment creates less 
costs. The analysis of the paper mostly focuses on the third element by assessing the actual 
arguments of the Court in the light of the costs imposed on various agents and behavioural 
incentives created. It helps to ascertain the actual arguments of the Court in the light of the 
social impact they pose. 
 
It is worth noting that the framework operated in the paper does not intend to evaluate 
arguments of the Court in the light of particular conceptual economic criteria such as their 
allocative efficiency. It simply tries to ascertain a variety of legal arguments in the light of 
the ratio between benefits and costs created by alternative legal regimes (the retroactivity 
rule and the doctrine of the temporal limitation of a judgment)10 as well as incentives 
provided for particular agents. The analysis is of a positive character, ie it does not identify 
the way the Court needs to rule in a particular situation. The paper asks the costs and 
incentives for the particular agents observed by the arguments of the Court of Justice which 
determine whether the rule of retroactivity is or is not applied. Therefore, the analysis 
provided is based on the primary systemisation of the actual argumentation of the Court 
and a derivative evaluation of the argumentation in terms of its direct costs and incentives, 
not oppositely.  
 
The structure of the paper is determined by the focus of the analysis. First of all, the debate 
regarding the legitimacy of the consequences-based argumentation is briefly outlined. 
Secondly, the legal insights and costs related concerns of the temporality of the judicial 
review type of judgments11 are presented. Thirdly, the arguments of the Court regarding 
the application of the doctrine of the temporal limitation of a judgment are provided. 
Finally, a concise framework of the consequences-based arguments of the Court regarding 
the temporality of preliminary rulings is highlighted. 
 
2. CONSEQUENTIALISM AS A ‘METHOD’ OF ARGUMENTATION 
 
There is a continuous debate regarding the content of legitimate arguments in courts. 
Therefore, one could reasonably ask whether the reasoning of a court based on social 
consequences is permissible at all. The orthodox view on legal interpretation lies in the idea 
that it is the text-based and text-bound finding of the correct meaning of a legal norm.12 
Thus, the applicable rule is derived from the internal system of law. The argument could be 
derived from the works of Niklas Luhmann, who argued that legal adjudication is 
conditionally programmed by the legislator. To be precise, if certain conditions are fulfilled 
                                                 
9 Cserne (n 7) 45. 
10 This would appear to be the criterion of the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency at a first glance. However, the criterion 
of Kaldor-Hicks tends to narrow the analysis to the homogenious agents which are to be affected by a 
particular legal change as conceptually a legal change (the change for an alternative legal regime) seems to be 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient if it maximises net aggregate social welfare, ie the sum of the individuals' welfare 
regardless of whether each individual is better off (see Richard A Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (3rd 
edn, Aspen Law & Business 1986) 11-13. Notwithstanding, the analysis of the paper evaluates the 
argumentation of the Court comprehensively by highlighting the effects on costs or the net benefit of a legal 
change for all the relevant agents: individuals, Member States, the European Commission. 
11 In particular, the preliminary ruling procedure. 
12 Stefan Mayr, ‘Putting a Leash on the Court of Justice? Preconceptions in National Methodology v Effet 
Utile as a Meta-Rule’ (2012/13) 5 EJLS 8, 12. 
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then a certain judgment has to be reached.13 Moreover, the argumentation is a special mode 
of operation of the system, specialised in the self-observation which is focused on the 
distinction and denotation of arguments on the basis of texts.14 The arguments addressed 
by Luhmann against consequentialism are ‘the argument of legal certainty’, ‘the argument 
of legal equality’, ‘the argument of overburdening the courts’ and ‘the statement that 
consequentialism jeopardises the independence of the courts’.15 However, the importance of 
consequences arises due to the critique regarding the logically-based reasoning of courts as 
a relatively vulnerable and too pretentious method in the practice of courts. For instance, 
formal syllogising is a tool pretending to a certainty and regularity which do not exist in 
fact. The effect of such pretension is increasing uncertainty and social instability. It is for 
this reason that either logic must be abandoned or it must be relative to consequences 
rather than antecedents.16 
 
The founder of the theory of law as integrity, Ronald Dworkin, has noted the principles as 
integral elements of the law.17 He insisted that judges need to restrict arguments based on 
principles rather than policies, which need to be left to the legislator.18 However, as Neil 
MacCormick has argued: 
 
[T]he spheres of principle and of policy are not distinct and mutually opposed, but 
irretrievably interlocking […]. To articulate the desirability of some general policy-goal is 
to state a principle. To state a principle is to frame a possible policy-goal.19 
 
Furthermore, MacCormick has stated the necessity of arguments based on consequences 
stating that decisions need to be based on various criteria such as justice, common sense, 
public policy, and legal expediency.20 Thus, shifting the focus on the consequences of a 
judgment helps to improve the deficiencies of formal reasoning as consequence-based 
reasoning can be identified as being instrumental, forward-looking and often policy-
oriented.21 
 
One of the early proponents of consequentialism in law, Oliver W Holmes, has noted the 
importance of consequences in the process of adjudication:  
 
[C]ertainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical 
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative 
grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root 
and nerve of the whole proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form […] [But] 
[i]t is because of some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of 
some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not 
capable of exact quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact 
logical conclusions.22 
                                                 
13 Niklas Luhmann, Rechtssoziologie 2, Reinbek bei Hamburg in Klaus Mathis, ‘Consequentalism in Law’ (2010) 
LawEcon Workshop, University of Bonn, 3-4 <http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-
1/lawecon-workshop/archive/paper-mathis> accessed 25 April 2013. 
14 Niklas Luhmann, ‘Legal Argumentation: An Analysis of Its Form’ (1995) 58 MLR 285, 287. 
15 Klaus Mathis, ‘Consequentalism in Law’ (2010), LawEcon Workshop, University of Bonn, 3-4 
<http://www.wipol.uni-bonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/paper-mathis> accessed 
25 April 2013. 
16 John Dewey, ‘Logical Method and Law’ (1925) 10 Cornell LQ 17, 26. 
17 Nigel E Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 204-205. 
18 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Gerald Duckworth & Co 1977) 85-86. 
19 Neil MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (OUP 1978) 263. 
20 Mathis (n 15) 3-4. 
21 Cserne (n 7) 45. 
22 Oliver W Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1886/87) 10 HLR 457, 466. 
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Holmes’ critique of legal formalism and the exclusion from social reality by some opponents 
of a consequentialist approach in adjudication has been followed by other scholars. The later 
approaches of the legal realist Karl Llewellyn23, points made by pragmatists such as John 
Dewey24, together with legal scholars such as MacCormick support the statement that 
consequence is the element which helps to properly frame the decision making process.25 It 
could be argued that consequentialism escapes the boundaries created by the internal logic 
of an artificial system of law as it aims to achieve a factual change by a decision in the real 
world rather than the formal legitimisation of a decision with no conceptual links to the 
factual change that it determines. 
 
Moreover, the philosophic, economic and social ideas of the XVIII-XIX centuries have 
changed a lot in regards to attitudes to legal adjudication. One such change is the shift to 
consequentialism as a concept which requires applying arguments from a broader context 
(ie external arguments). Nowadays, it is widely accepted that consequentialism is an 
essential feature of law.26 Even more relevant to the practical implementation of the 
consequentialist approach by the courts is the concept of instrumentalism. The founder of 
this theory is the pragmatist John Dewey27. Instrumentalism is an approach which holds 
that reflective thought is always involved in transforming a practical situation.28 It is the 
theory according to which the aim (end) of the decision presupposes the method (mean). 
Therefore, we do not need to think about internal reasons if the purpose of the reasoning is 
stated as finding the best means to the end. It is worth noting that the framework of Cserne, 
which is employed in this paper, is based on instrumental theory. It is aimed at the 
optimisation of a judgment29 from the perspective of social consequences, thus it aims to 
achieve a particular end (reduce the costs) by using a particular methodology (ie the means). 
 
The approach of the Court of Justice regarding temporality might be placed into the theory 
of instrumentalism. The assumption which needs to be established is that the Court 
struggles to achieve the least costly approach to the question of temporality in the 
procedure for preliminary rulings. This assumption enables the argumentation of the Court 
to be analysed in the light of the conceptual frameworks of reasoning which are based on 
consequentialist (or instrumentalist) theories. Although the terms ‘consequentialism’ and 
‘instrumentalism’ are not the same, they are both derived from the same theoretical 
background and share similar qualities. Thus, for the analysis of the argumentation of the 
Court provided in the paper, the term ‘consequentialism’ is used and encompasses both the 
concepts of instrumentalism and consequentialism unless it is stated otherwise.  
 
To sum up, consequentialism provides a proper justification for arguments based on 
external sources, ie social consequences. This is important as the framework of 
consequences-based judgments is focused exceptionally on these types of factors. However, 
before the analysis based on the framework takes place, the temporality effect of judgments 
and preliminary procedure in particular needs to be discussed briefly.  
 
                                                 
23 See Karl N Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Wolter Kluwer Law & Business 1960). 
24 See John Dewey, ‘Logical Method and Law’ (1925) 10 Cornell LQ 
25 Mathis (n 15) 17-18. 
26 See Neil MacCormick, ‘On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences’ (1983) 58 NYULR 241. 
27 See ‘John Dewey (1859-1952)’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/dewey/> 
accessed 14 December 2013. 
28 Samuel E Stumpf, Philosophy: History & Problems (McGraw-Hill 1989) 424. 
29 Cserne (n 7) 45. 
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3. JUDGMENTS AND TEMPORALITY 
 
3.1 The Temporal Effects of Judgments 
 
To begin with, the question of temporal effects presupposes an explanation of how sources 
of law vary regarding temporal effects. The most general distinction is among statutory law 
and case law. Traditionally, there is not so much controversy in the case of statutory law: 
The statutory rule has a prospective effect except in certain particular situations.30 
Notwithstanding this, the judgments of courts follow a different approach. Historically, the 
default rule was opposite to statutory law, ie a judgment used to consider an explanation of 
existing law a priori.31 Thus, the retroactive effect used to be a good and justifiable option at 
least in common law countries.32 However, concerns over the harsh consequences of such 
retroactive effects arose as it became obvious that the conventional rule is not the most 
reasonable solution in all situations.33 For the sake of clarity, the mixture between the 
possible temporal effects of a judgment should be analysed taking into account the 
functional features of not only common law but continental courts as well. 
 
This paper deals with a specific type of judgments - judicial review. The concept of judicial 
review type judgments in courts began to develop in Europe after WWII and was 
influenced by the proposals of the prominent Hans Kelsen.34 The idea of judicial review type 
judgments lies in the jurisdiction of the special court (which usually has the term 
‘Constitutional’ in the title) to annul statues enacted by legislators. This analogous approach 
has been consequently adopted by the administrative courts regarding the sub-statutory 
law.  
 
The judicial review type judgment deals with statutory law and may annul it. Various legal 
frameworks establish different rules regarding the temporality of a judgment which annuls 
the statutory rule. In case of constitutional judicial reviews there could be at least three 
most common approaches: (i) The court determines when an annulled legislation will cease 
to have effect at some point in the future; (ii) the courts assign the retroactive or non-
retroactive effects of a decision, determine the date on which the legislation ceases to have 
effects; (ii) the court decides to bring back previously repealed legislation when declaring 
the present one null.35 
 
The situation in case of the jurisdiction of administrative courts to exercise a judicial review 
is not uniform. The temporal effect of the judgments of administrative courts in Europe was 
traditionally retroactive as it is still the conventional rule.36 However, retroactivity has 
                                                 
30 The conventional rule of the temporality of statutory law is ‘ex nunc’. This is related to the notion that 
persons should be entitled to know what the law governing their conduct is at the moment of their actions. 
However, the feature of such predictability could be sometimes reversed and could need a specific justification 
(see Stephen R Munzer, ‘Retroactive Law’ (1977) 6 J of L Studies 373).  
31 The idea is that an ordinary court is an institution which deals with a situation which happened in the past 
at the time the legal regime existed. Thus, a court should understand and deal with a law which existed at the 
moment legally important facts occurred. Special remarks should be made regarding the exclusion of non-
ordinary courts such as constitutional courts which directly deal with statutory law. In addition, the analogous 
function of specialised courts such as administrative courts regarding statutory law should also be taken into 
account.  
32 Thomas S Currier, ‘Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling’ (1965) 51 VLR 201. 
33 eg Harper v Virginia Dept. of Taxation. U.S. Supreme Court Judgment of 18 June 1993, Case No. 91-794, 509 
U.S. 86. 
34 Allan R Brewer-Carias, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators: A Comparative Legal Study (CUP 2011) 13. 
35 ibid 94. 
36 See the website of the Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union <http://www.aca-europe.eu/index.php/en/tour-d-europe-en> accessed 7 March 2013. 
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always been disputed as a blind application which could determine devastating 
consequences. Thus, the relatively new practice of the French Conseil d’Etat37, the highest 
administrative tribunal in France, which was also a precursor of the Court of Justice, was 
inspired by a similar approach of the Court in its application of the doctrine of the limitation 
of the temporal effects of a judgment38 (referred to below as ‘the Doctrine’ or ‘the doctrine 
of temporal limitation’) as well as by comparable approaches in Germany, Austria and 
Italy.39 
 
3.2 The Preliminary Ruling Procedure and Temporality 
 
The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice under the procedure for a preliminary ruling looks 
towards two fundamental goals: The interpretation and the validity of EU law40. The 
validity of its jurisdiction is confined to the acts of institutions. It is worth noting that the 
grounds for the invalidity of acts are the same as in actions for annulment procedures under 
Article 263 of the TFEU41. The interpretative function of the Court is wide and it 
encompasses the jurisdiction to interpret the founding Treaties of the EU, acts of 
institutions (even including non-binding acts) and statutes of bodies established by an act of 
the European Council.42 
 
Although the Court is prohibited from the interference in matters regarding the reference 
source (ie the national law in particular)43 it provides an interpretation of EU law in the 
context of the points of law stated by the referring institution.44 Thus, the framework of the 
preliminary ruling procedure might be seen as a clarification of EU law in the light of a 
national law by de facto establishing whether the national rule conforms to EU law. In cases 
where a national rule does not satisfy the EU law, the clarification of the Court of EU law 
might look like a shaping of the proper national rule without even interfering in national 
jurisdictions. The reason the clarification of the Court shapes national rule is the obligation 
of Member States to take any appropriate measure, either general or particular, to ensure 
the fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the 
institutions of the Union.45 
 
Therefore, if the Court rules that a national rule does not correspond with EU law, it is for 
the national rule to be interpreted retroactively for the time the particular EU rule has been 
operating. This means that domestic courts are obliged to deal with a ‘new’ national rule 
after the preliminary ruling has been published. It also means that the various agents of 
national law (natural, legal persons, institutions etc.) might have a right to claim for 
damages against Member States46 or individuals who relied on the ‘old’ national rule. In 
terms of the costs of the issue, which is determined by the retroactive temporal effect, 
although Member States are monitored by the European Commission (referred to below as 
‘the Commission’) regarding the application of EU law and interested parties, the creative 
                                                 
37 From 2004, see Judgment of Conseil d’État, Case 114: 865 Association AC et autres [2004]. 
38 To be precise, ‘the doctrine of limitation of temporal effects of a judgment in the preliminary ruling 
procedure’; Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) [2010] OJ L83/47. 
39 Jean Massot, ‘The Powers and Duties of the French Administrative Judge’ in Susan Rose-Ackerman and 
Peter L Lindseth (eds), Comparative Administrative Law (Edward Elgar Publishing 2010) 424. 
40 Steiner, Woods and Twigg-Flesner (n 4) 193. 
41 TFEU (n 38). 
42 Steiner, Woods, Twigg-Flesner (n 4) 195. 
43 Case 13/61 De Geus en Uitdenbogerd v. Robert Bosch GmbH [1962] ECR 00089. 
44 Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 01141 
45 TFEU (n 38), Article 4. 
46 Based on the arguments for member state liability in the Francovich case. See Case C-479/93 Andrea 
Francovich v Italian Republic [1995] ECR I-03843. 
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approach of the Court47 might be underestimated by persons and Member States. Such 
underestimation might be influenced by the following factors: the political power of the 
Court, its creativity and the specific situations in which the boundary of whether a national 
rule conforms to EU law is not yet clear until the Court states so.  
 
As a reliance on a national rule might be risky for some agents, there seems to be space for 
the exceptional framework which enables the Court to escape the harsh consequences of the 
retroactive temporal regime of a preliminary ruling. This framework has been adopted in 
the aforementioned Defrenne case in 1976 and has been applied several times. Exceptions to 
the conventional rule have an impact on the content of the legal certainty by weakening the 
reliance on the conventional rule – retroactivity. Hence, there seems to be a trade-off 
regarding the costs of two alternative rules: the cost of the reliance on a conventional rule 
by some agents, and the cost of retroactivity for some agents, which will need to 
compensate for the defection of a national rule (primarily, the Member States). 
Furthermore, it seems that the reasoning of the Court regarding the doctrine of temporal 
limitation deals with particular factors and it might be useful to depict those. 
 
The rationale of the positive analysis of the reasoning lies in the idea of the feasible 
consequences-based argumentation of courts. Although the temporality regime of the 
preliminary ruling procedure is not clear enough48 the Court has depicted particular 
elements of the argumentation which might be evaluated from the perspective of the social 
consequences. Therefore, the costs determined by those arguments need to be revealed as 
well as the legal background of the doctrine of temporal limitation. 
 
4. THE CONSEQUENTALISM OF TEMPORAL LIMITATION 
 
4.1 Legal Insights into the Doctrine 
 
As has already been stated, the doctrine of the temporal limitation of a preliminary ruling 
has been introduced by the Court of Justice in the Defrenne case in 197649. The purpose of 
this move by the Court was the circumvention of serious economic repercussions on those 
parties (ie employers) who would otherwise have had to pay compensation due to a breach 
of the equal pay principle.50 The problem arose due to the fact that national courts must 
apply the conventional rule of retroactivity to situations which occurred before the Court of 
Justice provided a preliminary ruling.51 In general, the question of temporal limitation 
needs to be considered by the Court in cases in which a retroactive application may give rise 
to serious repercussions as regards the past.52 The doctrine of temporal limitation which is a 
focus of the paper is actual in interpretative judgments of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
The preliminary rulings on validity are assimilated to those of a successful annulment 
action regarding the temporal effect of a judgment.53 In this type of procedure the Court of 
Justice has limited the temporal effects in number of cases such as the Roquette Frères.54 
 
For a more rigorous view over the factual application of the doctrine of temporal limitation 
and tendencies, particular empirical data is provided in Table 1. Apparently, during the 
                                                 
47 The political impact of the Court is widely recognised and discussed, eg Alter (n 1). 
48 Steiner, Woods and Twigg-Flesner (n 4) 217. 
49 Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II [1976] ECR 455. 
50 Steiner, Woods, Twigg-Flesner (n 4) 217. 
51 Paul Craig, EU Administrative Law (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 707. 
52 Steiner, Woods and Twigg-Flesner (n 4) 218. 
53 ibid 220. 
54 Case 145/79 SA Roquette Frères v French State [1980] ECR 02917. 
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period from 1 April 1976 to 1 May 2012 there were 35 requests to apply the Doctrine. The 
Court only applied the Doctrine in seven cases. The results provided are based on an 
analysis in the online search tool of the judgments of EU courts.55 The search was carried 
out by analysing the preliminary rulings with the key phrases ‘temporal limitations’, 
‘doctrine of temporal limitation’, ‘temporal effect’ and ‘ratione temporis’ explicitly 
mentioned.  
 
 
Number of Court cases 
from April, 1976 to 
May, 2012 (only 
preliminary rulings56) 
Number of cases in which 
a Member state or a 
national court requested / 
asked for a temporal 
limitation 
Number of cases in which 
the Court applied the 
doctrine of temporal 
limitation 
4 486 35 757 
Table 1 Factual application of the doctrine of temporal limitation 
 
According to the data provided in Table 1, the Doctrine is not a widespread phenomenon. 
Therefore, the Doctrine cannot be identified as the new conventional rule regarding the 
temporal effects of a judgment. The question which arises is whether the importance 
attributed to the Doctrine is not an error in personal judgment? To be precise, the error in 
personal judgment could occur if persons with limited information exaggerate an issue with 
a higher than factual probability just because the level of reliance increases inadequately 
after a prominent case involving the Court.58 The reliance costs could be various here. They 
can mostly be related to the decreasing belief in the legal certainty (ie the conventional 
retroactive rule) by interested persons who become too cautious in regard of national laws 
implementing EU law. This shift might lead to a situation in which interested persons 
contest national law in cases where it is not really sufficient, ie by investing more than is 
reasonably needed in their assets under the present legal regime just because of the lack of 
certainty. It may lead to needless private litigation costs. Therefore, there needs to be some 
clear explanations related to the exceptionality of the doctrine of temporal limitation and 
the specificity of the Doctrine. Some observations might be highlighted. 
 
Firstly, the Doctrine is applied in very different cases. Thus, the probability of its 
application cannot be based merely on the existing experience as it is not clear what the 
next field of EU law in which the Doctrine will be applied will be. Secondly, the essence of 
the Doctrine precludes all preliminary rulings to be included in the estimation as the 
Doctrine is applied only in exceptional circumstances in important cases59 when the 
retroactive effects can be sufficiently detrimental, as usually this is not an issue. Lastly, 
although the Doctrine was introduced in 1976, its application has not been equally 
                                                 
55InfoCuria (Case law of the Court of Justice) 
<http://curia.europa.eu/juris/recherche.jsf?language=en&jur=C,T,F&td=ALL> accessed 9 December 2012. 
56 ‘Reference for a preliminary ruling’ and relatively recently adopted ‘Preliminary reference - urgent 
procedure’. 
57 Those seven are Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II [1976] ECR 455; Case 24/86 Blaizot v Université de 
Liège and Others [1988] ECR 00379; Case 262/88 Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990] 
ECR I-01889; Case C-163/90 Administration des douanes and droits indirects v Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-
04625; Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] 
ECR I-04921; Case C-308/93 Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank v Cabanis-Issarte [1996] ECR I-02097; 
Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-01157. 
58 Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein and Richard H Thaler, ‘A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics’ in 
Cass R Sunstein et al. (eds.) Behavioral Law and Economics (CUP 2000) 37. 
59 eg Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II [1976] ECR 455, Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de 
football association and Others v Bosman and Others, [1995] ECR I-04921 and others. 
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distributed in time. As can be seen in Figure 1, the Doctrine has not been intensively 
applied throughout all the period from 1976. It is noteworthy that during some periods the 
Doctrine was not even considered (ie it was not requested by Member States). Thus, this 
creates even more uncertainty as it is not clear what could contribute to a new wave of 
application of the Doctrine. This factual situation raises the reliance costs as the uncertainty 
induces risk-reducing investments in private assets by owners in order to prevent an 
uncertain outcome. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Analysis of Consequences-based Argumentation of the Court 
The positive analysis of the actual consequences-based reasoning of the Court consists of 
the representation and identification of relevant arguments employed by the Court to justify 
one of two following alternative rules: (i) the conventional retroactive effect rule or (ii) the 
doctrine of temporal limitation. The process of tackling cases is identified assuming the 
framework of Cserne60 is applied. Therefore, first of all, the Court starts to deal with a case 
without having any knowledge of the relevant facts. It analyses each case and identifies the 
factual elements which matter. Subsequently, the Court analyses the impact of possible 
decisions and, finally, evaluates which of the alternatives poses the least costs to the macro-
lever real consequences.  
 
The Court does not explicitly depict the dimension of costs while reasoning. However, the 
legal arguments which are employed by the Court might be ascertained. The judgments of 
the Court have a normative character due to their power. Therefore, they create various 
costs and have a particular impact on the behaviour of different agents by creating 
incentives. The doctrine of temporal limitation was introduced mainly due to the 
prospective costs for the agents of the member state (ie the employers in the Defrenne 
case61). This means that the basic rationale of the Doctrine is based on particular 
consequences-based evaluations. Accordingly, a more comprehensive costs-focused 
approach of the main important factors determining the application of the Doctrine may be 
depicted.  
 
                                                 
60 Cserne (n 7) 45. 
61 Defrenne v SABENA II Case 43/75 [1976] ECR 455. 
Figure 1 Factual application of the doctrine of temporal limitation by the Court of 
Justice. 
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4.2.1 Exceptionality  
 
Probably the most pervasive notion regarding the Doctrine is its exceptionality. The 
Court has stated that in determining whether or not to limit the temporal effect of a 
judgment it is necessary to bear in mind that although the practical consequences of any 
judicial decision must be weighed carefully, the Court cannot go so far as to diminish the 
objectivity of the law and compromise its future application on the grounds of the possible 
repercussions which might result.62 
 
The notion of the objectivity of the law reflects the value of the legal certainty regarding 
the conventional procedural rules. It is necessary to reiterate that in case of the temporal 
limitation, the Doctrine is not prescribed in statutory law. Hence, it arises from the 
consequentialist idea that there might be exceptional situations when the net benefit of the 
stable regime under the conventional rule is less than the net benefit after the saved costs 
which might appear due to, for instance, harsh financial obligations. Thus, the conventional 
retroactive rule creates legal certainty. The Court indirectly acknowledges that the general 
trade-off is between the costs of the legal certainty of the conventional rule and the direct 
costs of the judgment due to retroactivity. According to the Court, legal certainty should, in 
general, prevail as the feature which ensures the expectations of individuals. 
 
4.2.2 The Commissions’ Contribution 
 
Furthermore, the arguments of the Court touch upon the notion of windfall losses for those 
Member States and individuals who relied on the ‘old’ national rule. These windfall losses 
lie in an idea directly related to legal certainty and reliance investments of relevant agents. 
The possibility of windfall losses means that the current situation of agents is such so that 
there might be a surprising and unexpected loss which was not predicted in advance. This 
effect is created by the Doctrine and the Court tries to mitigate this. The context of the 
argument might be seen in the light of the factual situation of the following Defrenne63 case. 
The applicant was working as a cabin steward for an airline. Her employment contract 
prescribed her and other female cabin stewards a different salary in comparison to what was 
paid to male cabin stewards. She brought a claim to a national court, which referred to the 
Court for a preliminary ruling. The Court declared that the national rule contradicted the 
principle of equality entrenched in EU law. The government raised the question of 
retroactivity. In addition, the Commission has never initiated proceedings against a member 
state due to the improper application of EU law. 
 
It is worth noting that one of the core arguments used by the Court in the Defrenne case was 
the fact that the Commission had not initiated proceedings against Member States 
concerned on the grounds of a failure to fulfil an obligation. This argument could be 
identified as a tool which helps to prevent windfall losses for persons who were following 
the ‘old’ national rule. According to the Court, the contribution of the Commission, which 
was in a position to notice the situation but did not act in order to change it, should be such 
so as to reasonably lead the authority of a member state to uncertainty.64 The criterion of 
‘reasonableness’ is not clear in itself, but it does give at least a general idea of the boundaries 
of a reasonable person. In addition, the argument provides incentives for the Commission to 
monitor the compliance of national law to EU law more actively. 
 
                                                 
62 Case 24/86 Blaizot v Université de Liège and Others [1988] ECR 00379. 
63 Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II [1976] ECR 455. 
64 Case C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-01157. 
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4.2.3 Good Faith 
 
Furthermore, the Court has adapted the notion of good faith, which is probably a way to 
fill in the gap of vagueness of the concept of reasonableness. Accordingly, only a member 
state which behaves in good faith may successfully request to apply the Doctrine. The 
following situation in the Stradasfalti65 case highlights the rationale of this argument. The 
authorities of Italy knew that the tax measure they apply did not comply with EU law. 
However, the measure was justified by the wording of ‘cyclical economic reasons’ embedded 
in an EU directive, which provided a possibility to derogate from the existing regulation. 
Even though it was supposed to be temporary at the time of the adopting of the measure, 
the Italian government continued to apply it 20 years later. 
 
Therefore, a member state should be an active and positive participant in the EU 
institutional framework, trying to comply with EU law in good faith according to the 
reasoning of the Court of Justice. Such an implication by the Court serves as a constraint on 
Member States which try to exploit features of the Doctrine. In terms of consequences-
based arguments, the Court creates particular restraint for the possible opportunism of 
Member States. For instance, a member state might be interested in the application of the 
Doctrine as it finds that all relevant criteria are met. Therefore, the criterion of the good 
faith enables the Court to test the factual behaviour of the institutions of a member state 
and reject the request even if other criteria are met.  
 
4. 2. 4 Economic Repercussions 
 
The first application of the Doctrine was related to the general trade-off between the net 
loss created by the exception from the conventional rule and the net loss consisting of the 
financial burden for relevant agents (ie employers). Thus, the existence of possible 
economic repercussions was the criterion applied from the first application of the 
Doctrine.66 In the Defrenne case the Court explicitly concluded that given the large number 
of persons concerned claims might seriously affect the financial situation of respective 
undertakings and even drive some of them to the bankruptcy.67 In its later judgments the 
Court extended the application of the economic repercussions criterion from private 
employers to branches of governments or municipalities of Member States68 and the 
financial stability of Member States in a more general sense.69 However, at the same time 
the Court created a clear boundary to Member States which perceive a possibility to justify 
the application of the Doctrine due to the presumable financial repercussions. In the Société 
Bautiaa70 case the Court stated that the financial consequences which might ensue for a 
government owing to the unlawfulness of a tax or its imposition never in themselves justify 
limiting the effects of a judgment of the Court. Such an argument explicitly shows the 
rigorous position of the Court towards an exclusive proposition of financial difficulties. 
Therefore, it might be an argument which impedes the opportunism of Member States as 
                                                 
65 Case C-228/05 Stradasfalti [2006] ECR I-08391. 
66 Michael Lang, ‘Limitation of the temporal effect of a judgment of the Court’ (2007), 35 Intertax 230, 233 
<http://www.eatlp.org/uploads/public/Lang%20%20Temporal%20effects%20of%20ECJ.pdf> accessed 19 
February 2013. 
67 Case 43/75 Defrenne v SABENA II [1976] ECR 455. 
68 Case C-163/90 Administration des douanes and droits indirects v Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-04625, Case 
C-437/97 EKW and Wein & Co [2000] ECR I-01157. 
69 Through the possible influence on the financing mechanism of social insurance. See Case C-262/96 Sürül 
[1999] ECR I-02685. 
70 Case C-197/94 Bautiaa and Société française maritime v Directeurs des services fiscaux des Landes and du Finistère 
[1996] ECR I-00505. 
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restricting them to abuse the current financial situation by worsening it even more in order 
to escape the retroactive application of the preliminary ruling.  
 
It is worth noting that the Court does not rely on the accurate estimations of losses 
provided by a Member State while dealing with the question of the temporal limitation of 
retroactivity rule. The Nádasdi71 case is one of the rare examples in which the exact amount 
of the loss in the case of the retroactive rule is presented. In this case the government has 
provided a detailed estimation of the losses (116 million Euros) which would occur if the 
Court decided that the national rule contradicts EU law. However, the Court has not been 
convinced by the proposition of the Member State. It again puts forward the restriction on 
the opportunism of Member States, meaning that despite the accurateness of the estimated 
costs, there still needs to be other important elements to grant a relief from the retroactive 
effect of the preliminary ruling procedure.  
 
4.2.5 Intricate Legal Relationships 
 
A variety of cases have enabled the expansion of the concept of direct losses from pure 
economic repercussions to other comparable concepts as well. The seminal case was the 
Bosman72 case in 1995. The situation was as follows. The applicant was a football player 
playing for RFC Liège in the Belgian First Division in Belgium. After the termination of his 
contract, he decided to sign a contract and moved to Dunkerque, a French team. However, 
according to the rules of the Royal Belgian Football Association at the time a professional 
footballer who is a national of one Member State could not be employed by a team of 
another Member State upon the expiry of his contract with a team unless the latter team 
had paid a transfer fee or a training and development fee to his former team. The legal 
relationships between football players and teams, as well as among teams, regarding 
football players are governed by a very complex system of rules of their respective national 
associations and by UEFA (at the European level) as well as FIFA (at the international 
level). The player appealed to a national court which then referred to the Court for a 
preliminary ruling. 
 
The Court provided a different test of direct costs indicating that the specific features of the 
rules laid down by sporting associations for the transfers of players between teams of 
different Member States, together with the fact that the same or similar rules applied to 
transfers between teams belonging to the same national association and between teams 
belonging to different national associations within the same member state, may have caused 
uncertainty as to whether those rules were compatible with EU law. Thus, the Court 
extended the potential financial loss as direct costs to the more sophisticated concept of the 
uncertainty of a situation in the context of intricate legal relationships.  
 
4.2.6 Actions of Litigants before the Judgment 
 
The Doctrine is an instrument that does not only help to evade harsh direct losses as it 
creates costs as well. Among these are incentives for individuals to address national courts 
and seek damages due to the improper application of EU law. The loss in this situation is 
that in the light of a temporal limitation, persons understand that a ‘new’ national rule 
might be applied to them retroactively. Thus, they might be hindered from addressing the 
improper application of EU law if an ‘old’ rule is beneficial to them. Such a situation creates 
                                                 
71 Case C-290/05 Nádasdi [2006] ECR I-10115. 
72 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR 
I-04921. 
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costs as it deters persons from a reasonable investment in their assets in those fields which 
are debatable as regards their compatibility with EU law if we assume that EU law 
promotes efficiency by reducing entry barriers to markets or stimulating the capabilities of 
the EU single market.  
 
However, the actual application of the Doctrine takes into account such incentives. In the 
Legros case73 the Court concluded that neither the provisions of EEC Treaty in relation to 
charges related to customs duties on imports nor Article 6 of the Agreement between the 
Community and Sweden may be relied upon in support of claims for the refunding of 
charges such as dock dues paid before the date of this judgment, except by claimants who 
had initiated legal proceedings before that date or who had raised an equivalent claim. Thus, 
while applying the Doctrine the Court excludes those persons who did not address the 
‘old’ rule of national law actively before a judgment by the Court. In addition to the 
proposition of the Court to overcome fear to invest in some ‘risky’ assets, it also induces 
individuals to monitor and appeal possible improper applications of EU law in national 
courts.  
 
4.2.7 Interconnection of Cases 
 
The application of the Doctrine creates dubious effects on negatively affected persons if they 
(including Member States) were able to assess the risks in advance and internalise them. 
Thus, there might be a tool that would prevent those persons from compensating their 
losses if they were able to assess that a rule does not correspond EU law. It is worth noting 
that the Court had distinguished this argument by stating that the limitation of the 
temporal effects of a judgment could be carried out only if an actual judgment upon 
the interpretation was sought.74 This means that it is not possible to circumvent a 
retroactive application of the changed interpretation of EU law if there is another judgment 
similar to the present case. This criterion of ‘interconnection’ can be illustrated in the field 
of tax law, as it is this field that the factor has been mostly applied. The criterion is 
supposed to help to avoid a situation in which taxpayers in one member state are still able 
to exercise their rights, whereas the taxpayers in another member state cannot do so due to 
a non-retroactive judgment, even though the same fiscal periods are concerned.75  
 
4.2.8 Existence of the Request 
 
The procedural element that is considered by the Court is the existence of a request of a 
Member State or a national court76. It is an obligatory condition to apply the Doctrine in 
the majority of the Court cases in which the question regarding the Doctrine was analysed. 
The Court has never limited the temporal effect of a judgment ex officio. This factor could be 
even called the first precondition for the Doctrine within the reasoning of the Court. It 
seems that this precondition of the Doctrine does not have any explicit effect on social 
consequences merely being a formal requirement.  
 
                                                 
73 Case C-163/90 Administration des douanes and droits indirects v Legros and Others [1992] ECR I-04625. 
74 Case C-415/93 Union royale belge des sociétés de football association and Others v Bosman and Others [1995] ECR 
I-04921. 
75 Ariane Wiedmann, ‘Non-Retroactive or Prospective Ruling by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities in Preliminary Rulings According to Article 234 EC’ (2006), (E) 5/6-2006 The European Legal 
Forum 197, 199 < http://www.simons-law.com/library/pdf/e/682.pdf> accessed 12 February 2013. 
76 Case C-423/04 Richards [2006] ECR I-03585, Case C-57/93 Vroege v NCIV [1994] ECR I-04541, Case C-
367/93 Roders and Others v Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen [1995] ECR I-02229. 
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To sum up, the factors that are highlighted by the Court of Justice regarding the effect of 
the Doctrine on various agents in terms of costs and incentives, it is difficult to summarise 
the structure of the argumentation of the Court and the effect this has on costs and 
incentives. For this reason insights into the relevant factors of the Courts’ reasoning are put 
into the proposed framework of the consequences-based reasoning. 
 
5. THE CONCISE FRAMEWORK OF THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
Cserne77 focuses on so-called ‘behavioural consequences’ framework as the criterion with 
which to consider the least achievable costs and the effects on incentives of various agents in 
a particular case. This is quite distinct from the perspective of ‘judicial consequences’ which 
involves the analysis of a judgment as a bundle of consequences-as-implications as general 
rules for future cases.78 Behavioural consequences refer to ‘what human behaviour the rule 
will induce or discourage’ while judicial consequences refer to ‘what sorts of conduct the 
rule would authorise or proscribe’79. It is worth noting that the doctrine of temporal 
limitation is not merely a way to reason the unacceptable consequences regarding the social 
situation after the judgment (direct costs). The Doctrine also affects the behaviour of 
parties in other cases since it signals the expected manner of behaviour (providing 
incentives). Therefore, both facets of the consequentialism of the Court need to be 
addressed. 
  
Step 
Question to be answered 
by the Court 
Difficulties 
1. Identification 
Which consequences 
matter? 
Operationalisation 
2. Measurement 
What is the impact (costs 
and benefits) of the 
decision in these 
dimensions? 
Information 
3. Evaluation 
Which of the possible 
decisions has the best 
consequences (the least 
costs)? 
Trade-offs 
Table 2 Evaluation of the behavioural consequences of a judgment. 
 
Following the framework proposed, the first step of the analysis (exposing all the relevant 
factors which affect consequences according to the Court) is provided in the previous part of 
the paper in which those factors of the Courts’ reasoning regarding the subject-matter are 
introduced. Secondly, it is important to distinguish the possible consequences of a case in 
the relation to all factors provided by the Court. The judge is obliged to measure the 
prospective costs and benefits of possible different outcomes having in mind the different 
factors of reasoning regarding the temporal effect of a judgment and deciding in which case 
the consequences would lead to the situation with the least overall costs in terms of direct 
costs and behavioural incentives. The third step enables the particular trade-offs of 
divergent outcomes which are faced by the judge to be seen.  
 
                                                 
77 See Table 2. Evaluation of behavioural consequences of a judgment. More: Cserne (n 7) 45. 
78 To lead as a person of prudence and forethought any judge across the range of possible situations which will 
have to be covered by this ruling in point of right. See MacCormick, ‘On Legal Decisions and Their Consequences’ 
(n 26) 251. 
79 Backhaus (n 8) 15. 
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Therefore, the analysis of the actual application of the Doctrine in the practice of the Court 
might pose various concerns about the way judges approach the different possible outcomes 
of a case. The issue of the evaluation of every consequence and the comparison of them still 
need more comprehensive analysis. For the purposes of the positive analysis the 
identification of the current systemic approach of the Court is the most relevant concern. 
However, the vagueness of many of elements which are included in the framework of the 
Court might encourage discussion on their values and possible hierarchy.  
 
The actual presentation of the consequences-based argumentation of the Court consists of: 
(i) the actual arguments provided by the Court; (ii) costs related to particular arguments 
depending on whether the Doctrine is applied or not; and (iii) incentives related to the 
effects which a particular argument generates regardless of whether the Doctrine is applied 
or not. Hence, sections (ii) and (iii) are revealed in the paper after the analysis of the actual 
argumentation (i) of the Court. 
 
Factors (arguments) related to costs if 
the conventional rule of retroactivity is 
applied (conceivable incentives of the 
argument in general) 
Factors (arguments) related to costs if 
the doctrine of temporal limitation is 
applied (conceivable incentives of the 
argument in general) 
Argument: the Commissions’ 
contribution to uncertainty. Costs 
related to windfall losses by individuals 
who were not able to estimate risks 
objectively (incentives: Commission is 
induced to monitor the compliance of 
national law to EU law actively). 
Argument: Exceptionality of the 
Doctrine. Costs created by the 
uncertainty of the temporal regime rule 
(incentives: mitigating the improper 
perception of risks which are either 
under-investment or over-investment in 
precautionary measures (the reliance 
costs) due to the uncertainty created by 
the Doctrine). 
Argument: Good faith of a member 
state. Costs related to worthless 
endeavours on the part of the Member 
State by seeking compliance (incentives: 
the Member State is induced to seek a 
compliance of national law to EU law, 
Member States are discouraged from the 
opportunistic behaviour). 
Argument: Excluding persons who did 
not address the ‘old’ rule before the 
judgment of the Court. Costs related to 
investments by those persons who argued 
the improper national rule in court 
(incentives: persons are induced to 
address national courts and to search for 
more efficient rules other than the ‘old’ 
national rule). 
Argument: Intricate legal relationships 
regarding the subject-matter of a case. 
Costs related to the revaluation and 
restructuring of intricate legal 
relationships, the adjudication of costs in 
complex cases (incentives: creating 
complex legal relationships in order to 
escape retroactive application for those 
individuals who benefited from the 
improper ‘old’ rule). 
Argument: Actual judgment upon the 
interpretation sought. Costs related to 
the inefficient internalisation of risks by 
those persons who were able to perceive 
them (incentives: persons are induced to 
seek information on existing EU law and 
appeal improper national rules). 
Argument: Economic repercussions. 
Costs related to the direct financial losses 
of a Member State or other persons 
(incentives: creating large potential 
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financial losses for agents who will benefit 
from the Doctrine (mostly Member 
States)). 
Table 3. The concise framework of the legal arguments regarding the doctrine of 
temporal limitation by the Court of Justice. 
 
To sum up, the concise framework of the Court regarding the Doctrine provided in Table 3 
enables the different issues touched upon by the Court in order to prevent costly outcomes 
from happening and diverse social impact of the argumentation to be seen. In general, two 
arguments (the intricate legal relationships regarding the subject-matter of a case and its 
economic repercussions) seem to create some negative incentives for the parties and 
Member States. However, other arguments seem to work as a tool for the mitigating of 
such unfavourable outcomes by seeking to get the perception determined by the 
introduction of the Doctrine to the equilibrium. Nevertheless, the analysis conducted 
proposes an outlook on the subject-matter and further deeper research needs to be fulfilled 
in the future.  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
Dealing with the consequences of judgments is a matter of economic analysis of law which 
may be harnessed by judges in order to achieve more grounded outcomes of their decisions. 
One of the dimensions which might determine the social consequences of a judgment is its 
temporal effect. The doctrine of temporal limitation of a judgment is a tool which enables 
the Court of Justice to prevent harsh social consequences of the retroactive effect of a 
preliminary ruling procedure. However, the introduction of such a doctrine creates 
particular concerns regarding the costs and behavioural incentives for various agents from 
individuals to Member States and the European Commission. 
 
The doctrine of temporal limitation of a judgment of the Court of Justice is an attempt to 
balance the benefits of conventional retroactivity and costs which might be imposed on the 
parties. In the arguments concerning the doctrine of temporal limitation, the Court includes 
propositions related to costs if the conventional rule of retroactivity is applied (such as the 
Commissions’ contribution to uncertainty etc.) and propositions related to costs if the 
doctrine of temporal limitation is applied (such as an actual judgment upon the 
interpretation sought etc.). While reasoning judgments, the Court creates incentives which 
offset some of the costly effects of the doctrine of temporal limitation (primarily, the 
devaluation of legal certainty). Therefore, the Court searches for the proper approach by 
minimising the costs of the retroactivity of a judgment and for the reasonable behavioural 
incentives for various agents at the same time.  
